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ABSTRACT 
ALLIANCES, SHARED IDENTITY, AND CONTINUED COOPERATION 
David Frederick Lemmons, B.A., George Mason University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Renee Scherlen 
 Realists and liberals dominate the literature on alliances. Realists tend to 
emphasize the competitive nature of international politics, and therefore are pessimistic 
about the ability of states to cooperate for long periods of time. Liberals, on the other 
hand, see alliances as a practical way for states to cooperate on a variety of issues. This 
study comes from a constructivist approach, arguing that both schools of thought miss 
important aspects of the alliance process. It is identity, not competition or cooperation 
that best explains alliances’ ability to persist. Through case studies on NATO, CENTO, 
and the US-South Korean alliance, this study shows that identity means the difference 
between success and failure of alliances in many cases. It also uses quantitative methods 
to attempt to find generalizable conclusions. Strong identities are important for alliances, 
and this study argues that they can make alliances substantially more successful. 
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Introduction 
 Realism, the dominant American and European school of international relations 
analysis, understands alliances to have one particular purpose. States use alliances to 
accomplish a purpose, and once it has been accomplished the alliance disintegrates. 
However, this view misses a crucial part of alliances. Some alliances stay together after 
accomplishing their purpose. This study examines why some alliances stay together, 
while others end before they accomplish their original goal. 
 Realists understand alliances to have a particular purpose, either to combat a 
threat or make their commitments more credible (Fearon, 1997; Morrow, 1991; Morrow, 
1994). These agreements tend to be temporary, these authors argue, ending when their 
purpose is fulfilled. However, this view is grounded in Cold War ideas about alliances. 
After World War II, the Allies broke up into the two sides of the Cold War, realigning 
along ideological divisions after they defeated the Axis. However, in the post-Cold War 
era, alliances repurposing themselves are more common than total dissolution. NATO 
was originally constructed by its members to combat the Warsaw Pact, for example, but 
now takes the lead in military interventions like the one against Gaddafi’s forces in 
Libya. Realist authors don’t address the possibility of a change in focus for an alliance, 
and therefore are missing an important aspect of international relations. 
 Another major approach to IR, the traditional alternative to realism, is liberal 
institutionalism. Liberals (Doyle, 2003; Keohane & Nye, 2003) argue that conflict and 
competition aren’t something inherent or natural in the international system. Instead, this
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 approach focuses on how to make cooperation more practical. Complex interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye, 2003) and international regimes (Keohane, 2003) are two important 
concepts for liberals, arguing that as states become more connected they are less likely to 
have conflict with one another. Alliances for a liberal are not necessarily temporary, and 
instead can take the form of long-term, meaningful interactions between states. Liberals 
theorize that alliances are a means towards more cooperation in general, rather than to 
accomplish any one goal. However, there exist alliances (like the one between the US and 
South Korea) that are designed to look at one goal in particular. In the case of the US-
South Korean alliance, it is to combat North Korean power in the region. However, the 
alliance takes on more than one aspect throughout its development, and now functions as 
a trade relationship along with military and other forms of general cooperation. Liberals 
also miss something important, which is the relevance of specific goals to an alliance. 
They do not address the power that a single issue can have to spark an alliance’s 
formation. 
 This study adopts an alternative perspective, constructivism, which-it is argued-
adequately addresses all stages of the alliance “life cycle.” Constructivists (Finnemore, 
1996; Wendt, 2003) argue that national interests and the international system are both 
entirely socially constructed. Therefore, what constructs the system is very important to 
study in order to understand the way the system behaves. By changing the focus to these 
ideas and norms, constructivism has the most analytical power to explain things like 
alliance role change and persistence. Adopting this approach will give this study the 
ability to look beyond the state to the actors within it, showing how changing ideas and 
identities change the international system. 
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 However, very little literature has been written on how to quantitatively measure 
norms and identities. This is a problem for this study, as quantitative methods are very 
useful to make findings more general and overarching. In an effort to resolve this 
conflict, this study borrows its theory on methodology from Finnemore & Sikkink’s 1998 
article titled “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” where the authors 
outline ways to quantify norms. 
 This study explains why some alliances persist and change over time, while 
others’ existence ends when they fulfill their original purpose. In order to accomplish this 
goal, it will employ three case studies that provide a cross-section of modern alliances. 
NATO, the first case, is an example of a successful alliance that has both accomplished 
its goal and evolved into something new. CENTO is an example of an alliance that failed 
to accomplish its original goal, and this study uses CENTO as its second case. Finally, 
the alliance between the US and South Korea provides an example to demonstrate how 
the balance of power within an alliance can also affect identity and purpose within an 
alliance. 
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Chapter 1: Review of the Literature 
 Alliances are an important and often-studied phenomenon in the traditional 
approaches of IR. In particular, realism and liberalism, the two dominant schools of IR, 
often incorporate alliances into their analysis. Many realists and liberals use alliances as 
the main focus of their research. Because these two schools are the most dominant within 
the IR literature, it is important to examine them and see whether their assertions and 
assumptions are supported by the cases. This literature review does that in three major 
sections: theoretical literature, definitions of concepts, and methods for observing those 
concepts. 
Theoretical Approach 
 The literature on alliance persistence coalesces around three theoretical 
approaches: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Each theory presents a different take 
on the nature of the international system, from realists’ emphasis on power and anarchy 
to the liberal look at cooperation and finally to constructivism’s emphasis on ideas, 
norms, and identity. Their different views on the international system carry over into their 
conceptions of alliances and their persistence. 
 Realism is the dominant approach to international relations, especially in the US 
and Europe. Scholars employing realism take anarchy as a given within the international 
system (Morgenthau, 2003; Walt, 2003), and further theorize that anarchy necessarily 
leads to certain conditions within that system. John J. Mearsheimer (2001), for instance, 
argues that great powers are interested only in their survival and must employ military
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 power to attain that goal. Further, great powers can only rely on themselves, which 
makes cooperation much more difficult. Other realist thinkers expand on these findings, 
arguing that the survival-interested state has no need to cooperate with other states when 
all are playing a zero-sum game (Grieco, 2003; Waltz, 2003). One state’s gain is another 
state’s loss for a realist, and that emphasis on relative gains makes it very difficult to 
argue for the utility of long-term meaningful cooperation. Finally, realists assert that all 
states will act in the same way, regardless of domestic politics. It is states’ power relative 
to other states that matters, not type of government, culture, or any international rules or 
norms. 
 Realist work on alliances has focused on their utility, especially in military 
endeavors. For example, Leeds and Savun argue that alliances are “formal agreement[s] 
among independent states to cooperate militarily” (2007, p. 1119). They also argue that 
leaders will only enter into those alliances when motivated by some sort of external 
threat. Walt (2003) agrees, and further theorizes that alliances take one of two forms: 
balancing against a threat or bandwagoning with it. Most realists would agree that leaders 
or states form when they make calculations about power and threats. Military power is 
central to the realist understanding of international politics, and often states and leaders 
form alliances to combine and strengthen resources against a common enemy. After the 
alliance fulfills its purpose, the alliance ceases to exist. For a realist, then, two things are 
true about alliances. First, states form alliances because of a threat to the national 
interests of all states involved. Second, because alliances are based on threats, it is 
difficult for an alliance to evolve unless all states involved agree to respond to a new 
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threat. Realists would argue, therefore, that alliance evolution is less common that 
dissolution. 
 NATO is an example of an alliance that has evolved after completing its goal. On 
April 4, 1949, the alliance was created in an effort to bring forces on both sides of the 
Atlantic together in order to combat Soviet interests in the region. During the Cold War, 
NATO became the US’s answer to the Warsaw Pact. However, after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breaking-up of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has persisted. 
Its role has evolved, and now its nominal goals are to provide support for peaceful 
interaction in the international community and to promote democracy all over the world 
 Alliances pool resources between states to combat a common threat, in the realist 
argument. NATO, therefore, would only persist and evolve if new threats to all states 
existed. These threats, however, are not present. Instead, NATO’s purpose has become 
more collaborative in scope, allowing for cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic 
without a threat having to be present. Realists do not have an explanation for this. 
Without a common threat, there would be no practical purpose for remaining in an 
alliance. Liberalism, realism’s main rival, attempts to resolve this issue. 
 Many liberal works directly attack realism (Doyle, 2003; Keohane & Nye, 2003), 
arguing that conflict isn’t something inherent to the international system. Instead, they 
argue that the world is a positive-sum game, where absolute gains are what matters. 
Liberals, therefore, assert that states aren’t concerned with the gains of their neighbors, 
but with improving their own international situation. Another important detraction of 
liberalism from realism is that military power shouldn’t be at the center of international 
relations at all times. When Keohane and Nye developed their theory of complex 
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interdependence, they specifically stated that other types of issues, like human rights and 
economics, should be considered on the same footing as military issues (Keohane & Nye, 
2003). Complex interdependence links states in a way that conflict becomes too costly 
and impractical to use as a tool, and therefore peaceful tactics like cooperation and 
negotiation take to the forefront. Again, this emphasis on cooperation characterizes the 
liberal look at an international system that isn’t a zero-sum game. Finally, liberal authors 
argue that domestic politics matter. Democratic Peace Theory, the belief that liberal 
democracies will not go to war with one another, is a major liberal critique of realist 
thinking (Doyle, 2003). 
 For a liberal, alliances and international cooperation in general can be long-
lasting. In fact, liberals would argue that alliances both can and should be long-lasting, as 
cooperation is the best way for states to achieve their interests. Keohane (2003) outlined 
his “functional theory of regimes,” saying that international regimes are a good way to 
get states to cooperate internationally. Regimes are sets of rules, norms, and institutions 
surrounding a particular issue, like climate change, trade, or human rights. Keohane goes 
on to argue that regimes affect transaction costs, making it easier to go with a regime than 
to go against it (2003, p. 133). Other authors focus on international organizations and 
international law (Hoffmann, 2003), arguing that these laws create costs that make it 
difficult to go against them. Liberalism, then, emphasizes the power of international 
cooperation, regimes, and organizations to set the agenda. If the states agree to follow the 
rules set out by those institutions, then it becomes more difficult for a single state to go 
against those institutions. Liberals also have two assertions about alliances. First, states 
form alliances based on a perception that those alliances serve national interests better 
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than acting unilaterally. Second, alliances can be formed based around a larger set of 
issues than exclusively military ones. Finally, alliances persist as long as the relationship 
continues to be beneficial to all parties. 
 Liberals, like realists, make assumptions about the international system. Anarchy 
doesn’t necessarily mean that states cannot cooperate for a liberal, and liberals argue that 
cooperation is often a practical way to achieve the national interest. The way the world 
works for a liberal is that cooperation is better and easier than unilateral action. Just 
because their assumptions are very different from realist assumptions, however, doesn’t 
mean that liberals don’t also assume that they know the way the world works. Their 
assertions are underpinned by their understanding of an international system in which it is 
easier to cooperate than to act unilaterally. 
 Realists and liberals both make assumptions about the nature of the international 
system. Realists argue that anarchy necessarily leads to a competitive self-help system, 
whereby states are only interested in their own survival. Liberals, on the other hand, 
assert that cooperation is possible under anarchy, and is actually more practical than 
aggressive, unilateral action. However, both assume that states are a certain way, that 
there is something inherent about states or anarchy that either makes it difficult to 
cooperate or fosters it. Taking the nature of the international system for granted, however, 
is a weakness that both approaches share. 
 Constructivism is an approach designed to analyze the ideas and norms that make 
up assumptions about the inherent nature of the international system. Borrowing heavily 
from sociology, constructivists argue that the way that people understand reality is 
important. Perceptions shape how people interact with each other and with their world, 
 
9 
and therefore social scientists should consider them as a powerful motivating factor. A 
constructivist would argue that both realists and liberals start on a false idea, that there is 
anything inherent to the system or to states at all. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, 
sometimes norms become so institutionalized that actors begin to take them for granted 
or to believe that they are something inherent (1998). They go on to argue, however, that 
these assumptions are dangerous. Both realists and liberals take some facets of the 
international system as inherent, which implies that those facets cannot be changed. 
However, constructivists argue that as norms change in response to events, the 
international system also changes. 
 In an effort to expand social constructivism to the international level, many 
authors (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999) argue that states construct the international 
system the same way that people construct their states. In particular, Alexander Wendt 
says that social construction occurs on two levels. First, people get together and begin to 
codify their shared ideas and norms. This eventually constructs the state, which both 
constructs and is constructed by its citizens. In the same way, states construct the 
international system, which then constructs and is constructed by the states (Wendt, 
1999). The way that people understand international politics, then, eventually makes its 
way upward to the state and then onward to the international community. Constructivists, 
then, argue that ideas and norms about the international system shape how that system 
behaves. 
 When looking at alliances, constructivists tend to put identity at the center of their 
analysis (Checkel, 1999; Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002; Lai & Reiter, 2000). Thomas 
Risse-Kappan, for example, argues that NATO continues to exist because of a shared 
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“North Atlantic” identity between its members, an identity that did not exist before 
forming NATO (1996). Owen argues that ideologies can occasionally be an important 
motivating factor behind forming an alliance, like in his case of the Holy Roman Empire 
(2005). Other constructivist scholars (Barkin, 2003; Finnemore, 1996; Riim, 2006) argue 
similarly to realists, saying that national interests can dictate who joins what alliance. But 
as Finnemore argues, states and their citizens construct national interest (1996). A 
constructivist, then, argues two things about alliances. Like realists and liberals argue, 
states form alliances based on a perception that it is within the national interest to do so. 
The main difference between constructivists and authors within the other two schools, 
however, is that constructivists argue that states construct their interests. As the norms 
and ideas of their citizens change, so to can national interests of states. Second, alliances 
have the ability to form collective identities between their members. 
 This study will argue that the constructivist approach is the best to take when 
looking at alliance persistence. Realist and liberal ideas about inherent parts of the 
international system are both incorporated into a constructivist approach. Ideas, norms, 
and identities are at the center of constructivist analysis, and the cases that follow will 
show their power. 
Definitions 
 This section outlines the relevant literature defining key concepts for this study. 
These concepts include alliance-related terms, like persistence and purpose, and 
constructivist terms like norms and identities. After discussing the literature, this section 
outlines the definitions that are used in this study. 
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 The alliance literature defines its central concept, the alliance, in a few key ways. 
Realists argue that alliances have a particular purpose, and tend to base their definition in 
threat perception. Leeds and Savun, for example, say that alliances are “formal 
agreement[s] among independent states to cooperate militarily” (2007, p. 1119). Walt 
divides the concept of an alliance into two separate behaviors: balancing and 
bandwagoning. When a state balances, it allies with other countries in an effort to balance 
against a prevailing threat. Bandwagoning, on the other hand, occurs when a state allies 
with that threat in an effort to avoid the threatening country bowling them over (2003, p. 
108). Long, Nordstrom, and Baek argue that one-on-one military alliances actually tend 
to promote peace, countering the liberal argument that international institutions are the 
most effective way to do so (2007). James Fearon argues that alliances are a good way to 
make international actions and threats more credible, by making it very difficult for a 
state to break their promise or change their stance (1997). Realists, then, have a utilitarian 
perspective on alliances. States form alliances when they cannot rely only on themselves, 
and the agreements that states form must make it very difficult for a state to break them. 
This look, therefore, is still the self-help system outlined by Waltz, but with limited and 
specific cooperation. 
 When liberals look at alliances, they tend to focus on institutions rather than 
utilitarian or individual aspects. Keohane and Nye’s concept of complex interdependence 
naturally lends itself to discourse on alliances, as they argue that the more interconnected 
countries become, the less likely war becomes (2003). Interconnectedness is often 
achieved through the framework of alliances, with authors like Axelrod and Keohane 
emphasizing the central role that formal institutions play in fostering meaningful 
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cooperation (1985). Building off of the concept of Democratic Peace Theory, Lai and 
Reiter assert that the type of government a state has can affect the likelihood of alliance 
formation (2000). Liberals, then, look at two important things. First, they argue that 
formal institutions are necessary to achieve meaningful cooperation between allies. 
Second, they say that, while alliances are not necessarily peace-loving, they do provide 
for peaceful means to resolve conflicts. 
 As outlined in the previous section, this study will apply a constructivist approach 
to the study of alliances. Constructivists focus on the power of an alliance to form an 
identity or codify norms internationally, standing in contrast to the utilitarian or 
institutional focuses of the other approaches. Hemmer and Katzenstein argue that Europe 
and the US formed NATO based around a collective “North Atlantic” identity, and that 
the treaty writers needed to invoke that identity in their treaty to make the alliance more 
legitimate (2002). Other authors (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007; Suh, 2007) also 
point to the power of identity in alliances, arguing that a collective identity is an 
important factor in continuing cooperation. The constructivist approach centers around 
ideas, norms, and identities, and therefore this focus on alliances as mechanisms to 
achieve those shared ideas and norms is in keeping with the approach. 
 This study argues that alliances incorporate facets of realism and facets of 
liberalism. Often, alliances have their impetus in a perceived threat. However, as the 
states within an alliance continue to cooperate, the alliance’s role can evolve to 
incorporate other aspects of international politics. As it does so, the alliance forms a 
collective identity between its members. 
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 The purpose of an alliance is the goal or set of goals that its member states design 
it to accomplish. Again, this purpose is often motivated by a perceived external and 
common threat. For example, the US-South Korea alliance was designed to balance 
against a threat, North Korea. 
 Alliances will often explicitly state their purpose. Balancing against a threat is a 
common example, as is defending a smaller country against an entire region (as in the 
case of the US-Israeli alliance). Sometimes, alliances are formed based on a compromise 
between the member states, trading off some costs with some benefits. So, an alliance’s 
purpose is the goal or set of goals which members of an alliance state as the primary one 
of that alliance.  
 What is alliance persistence, and what makes it different from an alliance 
continuing over time? The key distinction between persistence and continuing over time 
is the alliance’s goal. If an alliance’s goal hasn’t been accomplished, then one can argue 
that the alliance continues because it still has to accomplish its goal. On the other hand, if 
an alliance has accomplished its goal then its persistence is more extraordinary. Alliance 
persistence is an alliance continuing to exist after it has accomplished its primary goal. 
As outlined in the alliance life-cycle, this persistence normally involves repurposing the 
alliance. This doesn’t necessarily mean a shift in the entire makeup and capabilities of the 
alliance, however. 
Methods 
 Norms are difficult to measure. Because they are exclusively subjective, they 
cannot be observed empirically. Researchers that attempt to measure them, therefore, 
must develop a way to observe them or their effects. The field of constructivism as a 
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whole has struggled with this methodological question, as the predominantly quantitative 
methods of international relations don’t lend themselves easily to the study of norms and 
other subjective phenomena. However, a few authors have attempted to answer these 
methodological problems, and this section provides an overview of that literature. 
 As Finnemore and Sikkink argue in “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” constructivism is uniquely 
situated at the crossroads between international relations and comparative politics (2001). 
The approach of constructivism asks questions that researchers can only answer by 
considering both domestic and international political phenomena. Wendt, for example, 
argues that norms are fashioned by states and other actors at both the international and 
domestic levels (1999). Hopf asserts that constructivism is able to deal with domestic 
phenomena, calling it one of the main strengths of the field (1998). With that body of 
literature in mind, constructivists tend to incorporate methods from both international 
relations and comparative politics. This study follows that tendency. 
 Case studies and focused comparisons are the typical tool used in comparative 
politics. This methodology provides a way to compare domestic processes and show 
trends over time. Many comparative politics scholars choose an area of specialty, gaining 
more in-depth knowledge about their region. These studies don’t have to deal with issues 
of oversimplification, as they provide a way to go more in-depth with a limited number of 
cases. 
 This study will use three cases to provide a cross-section of modern world 
alliances. The first case, NATO, has accomplished its goal and still persists.  Its role has 
evolved on the international stage, and is therefore an example of an alliance persisting. 
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The Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, is an example of a failed alliance, one that 
disintegrated before it could accomplish its goal. Finally, the alliance between the US and 
South Korea is a unique case, as the relationship between the two countries has evolved 
to the point that it brings the persistence of the alliance into question. 
 Large-N statistical analysis is one of the most widely-used methodologies in 
international politics. This tool is informed by the goal of the field, which is to make 
larger claims about the world as a whole. In order to do that, some generalizations are 
necessary and desirable. Quantitative research methods provide the tools necessary to 
make these large claims. 
 How does constructivism fit in with these methods? Again, the problem with 
norms and other subjective phenomena is that researchers cannot directly observe them. 
Therefore, constructivist researchers must devise a set of conditions that show the effects 
of norms. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that leaders must justify their 
actions when they engage in behaviors that violate norms, while they don’t need to justify 
themselves if they are acting within the norm (1998). To measure a norm, then, they 
argue that a researcher should look for when these leaders justify their actions in 
speeches. This study incorporates this methodological tool in its case studies, contained 
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
 Case studies, however, are only one section of this study. The other portion 
employs large-scale analysis in an effort to make generalizable claims about the world. 
To pursue this goal, Chapter 5 uses the World Values Survey (WVS) dataset. The WVS 
asks citizens of the countries included questions on issues like their support for 
democracy or level of religiosity. By doing so, it provides an interesting look at the 
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cultures of many different countries. The data collected by the WVS is a good fit for what 
this study needs: empirically observed, quantitative data on subjective phenomena. 
Because norms, culture, and identity are linked together, the WVS data shows the spread 
of norms and allows for comparison between member states of the same alliance. 
 Articles using WVS data (Pettersson, 2003; Welzel, 2007; Welzel & Inglehart, 
2005) tend to focus on domestic issues. Welzel and Inglehart’s article, for example, looks 
at the spread of liberal and postmaterialist values and its effects on democratization 
(2005). Pettersson’s article focuses on issues of global governance, comparing the values 
of Islamic societies to Western ones. This study will use WVS data, arguing that alliances 
with shared norms and values are more likely to persist over time. By combining macro-
level WVS data with micro-level qualitative data on individual cases, this study combines 
the strengths of both approaches. 
Study Outline 
 This study will use case studies and large-N analysis to look at its hypothesis that 
alliances with shared norms and values are more likely to persist over time. Chapter 2 is a 
case study of NATO, an alliance which has both accomplished its goal and has persisted 
over time. Chapter 3 will look at CENTO, which did not survive to accomplish its main 
goal of balancing against the Warsaw Pact. Chapter 4 will conclude the case studies, and 
will look at the US-South Korea alliance, which has not accomplished its main goal but 
its role has already begun to evolve. Chapter 5 contains the large-N analysis of alliances 
and values will take place, and the final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the main findings 
of the study and makes recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2: NATO 
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a multilateral alliance 
consisting of the US and many of its European allies. Currently, it provides for 
cooperation between its members on a wide variety of issues. Originally, however, the 
US and its allies designed it to counter Soviet influence in Europe. After the Soviet Union 
collapsed, NATO has persisted and has evolved into an extremely effective network of 
states. What prompted this evolution and persistence? Why does NATO still exist? 
Background 
 The original 12 member countries formed NATO on April 4, 1949. Those 
member countries included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States (NATO, 2012b). At the time, its purposes were to deter the expansion of 
Communism and the Soviets, stop any attempted revival of World War II-era militant 
nationalism in Europe, and further European political integration (NATO, 2012a). After 
the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb and the Korean War started, however, NATO 
incorporated military cooperation into its structure (NATO, 2012a). 
 Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, and West Germany followed in 1955 
(NATO, 2012b). By this time, NATO was a full-fledged military alliance designed to 
counter the Warsaw Pact, which had been formed by the Soviet Union, its satellite states, 
and other Communist states in 1955 in response to West Germany’s inclusion in NATO 
(U.S. Department of State, n.d.). The alliance hit an unexpected snag in 1966, when 
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France decided to remove itself from all military aspects of NATO (NATO, 2012a). After 
moving its headquarters to Belgium following that announcement, NATO moved into an 
era of détente, attempting to ease relations between the Soviet Union and United States. 
 However, after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, this era of détente 
was at an end (NATO, 2012a). After inducting a newly democratic Spain into the alliance 
in 1982 (NATO, 2012b), NATO began its old policy of balancing against the Soviets and 
the Warsaw Pact. In time, the Soviet Union began to show signs of weakness and the end 
of the Cold War was quickly upon the world. 
Purpose 
 What was NATO’s purpose at its onset? Its members originally designed it to 
balance against the Soviets. The end of World War II brought Europe to an interesting 
crossroads. Because the post-World War II era gave rise to two superpowers, the Soviet 
Union and the United States, European states had to make a decision on which power to 
support. For many European states, like the UK and France, the Soviet ideology was not 
something they could support. Therefore, they made the decision to incorporate the US 
into European politics. NATO provided the framework within which European 
democracies and the US could cooperate and balance against the Soviet Union. 
 NATO (2012a) itself argues that it had three purposes when it began. The first 
was to counterbalance the Soviets, the second to prevent the rise of more militant 
nationalism in Europe, and the third to encourage European integration. Clearly the 
second goal was a response to World War II, and reflected the desire of NATO member 
countries to stop Europe from returning to the conditions that predicated that conflict. 
The member countries’ first goal was a response to the perceived threat that Communism 
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posed to democracy and freedom, again reflecting the common ideology of NATO 
member countries. The third goal derives from the first two, with NATO countries 
wanting to encourage more interdependence in the region in an effort to stave off 
conflict. 
 NATO’s formation and its goals at that formation were a reflection of the times. 
Militant nationalism had just given rise to the bloodiest conflict the world had (and has) 
ever seen, and the looming threat of Soviet-style Communism was felt by many European 
states. By bringing in the US, NATO states hoped to balance against these threats and 
encourage more interdependence between their members. One could argue, therefore, 
that NATO at its onset combined realist ideas about power and balance with liberal ideas 
about cooperation and interconnectedness. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
however, NATO has seen a big shift in its purposes. The Berlin Wall falling in 1989 gave 
rise to the “new NATO.” 
Evolution 
 East and West Germany reunited as one after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and East 
Germany joined NATO as a part of that newly-reunified Germany (NATO, 2012b). Even 
though the Soviet Union no longer existed, NATO’s other two goals of preventing the 
rise of militant nationalism in Europe and promoting European integration were still 
important to its members. The post-Soviet power vacuum in much of Eastern Europe, 
further, was a source of instability in the region. One place that felt the fall of the Soviets 
very strongly was Yugoslavia, which devolved into civil war shortly after the Soviet 
Union’s fall. NATO became involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia in an air campaign in 
1995, and further implemented a peacekeeping force after the conflict ended (NATO, 
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2012a). Other conflicts also arose during this post-Soviet period, and NATO began to 
take an important role in promoting peace both in Eastern Europe and throughout the 
world. 
 In 1999, former Warsaw Pact countries Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic 
joined the alliance (NATO, 2012b). This was a major turning point for NATO, 
constituting the first post-Cold War enlargement of members. Making that enlargement 
consist of former Warsaw Pact countries was also significant, showing that NATO was 
willing to move past the Cold War and into the future. That future largely consisted of a 
newfound sense of identity among the members. “NATO country” ceased to be 
synonymous with “enemy of the Warsaw Pact” or “ally of democracy.” Instead, “NATO 
country” now signified a commitment to peace and cooperation in Europe and across the 
Atlantic. Without a clear enemy, NATO began incorporating these more aspirational 
goals into its identity. 
 In the second round of post-Cold War membership expansions in 2004, NATO 
chose to add seven more member states. Those states were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (NATO, 2012b). Again, many of these 
countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, with only one (Slovenia) having 
been a member of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War (Non-Aligned 
Movement, 2002). This second enlargement served to solidify the new NATO identity as 
an active participant in international politics, choosing to use military power when 
necessary. 
Present 
 The most recent round of membership expansion was in 2009, when Albania and 
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Croatia joined the alliance (NATO, 2012b). It went on to further expand its role in 
international relations by affirming a commitment to “address the full spectrum of crises 
– before, during and after conflicts” (NATO, 2010). One good example of this 
commitment is “Operation Unified Protector,” where NATO chose to intervene in the 
2011 civil war between Muammar Gaddafi’s forces and those rebelling against him 
(NATO, 2012c). This was the first large-scale NATO military intervention in a conflict 
since the war in Afghanistan of 2001, and was the first intervention since Yugoslavia that 
didn’t involve a direct attack on a NATO member. 
 What is NATO now? During the Cold War, it was a static and defensive 
organization designed to counter the Warsaw Pact. Since the Cold War, however, the 
alliance has taken a substantially more active role in international politics. NATO has 
expanded to include many former Warsaw Pact countries, showing that its identity is no 
longer tied to its adversaries. Why has NATO persisted? What makes this alliance so 
durable, even without a consolidated opponent? 
Analysis 
 NATO is an interesting case in a few ways. First, its member states signed the 
treaty and created it before its opposition had fully materialized. The Warsaw Pact wasn’t 
signed until 1955, whereas NATO was implemented in 1949. Second, it bears the 
distinction of being a successful alliance, having accomplished its purpose in 1989 with 
the fall of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, it is unique in 
that it has not relinquished its position at the forefront of international politics, even 
though its has accomplished its purpose. This final distinction is the relevant one for this 
study. 
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 Collective identity can be a powerful thing. Scholars like Risse-Kappan (1996) 
argue that this is one of the main reasons for NATO’s persistence. The Cold War formed 
NATO’s identity around ideas of peace and democracy, contrasting NATO with the 
Warsaw Pact. Even after the Warsaw Pact collapsed, however, ideas of democracy and 
peace still hold salience for many citizens of NATO countries. If NATO and its members 
see themselves as guardians of those values, then it’s clear why the organization has held. 
Democracy and peace are still important, and NATO sees itself as the alliance which best 
furthers those values. 
 Another interesting idea about collective identity in the case of NATO comes 
from Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002). These authors argue that the writers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty invoked a “North Atlantic identity” that legitimized cooperation between 
the member states. In addition, they argue that the ingredients for this identity already 
existed: having been allies during World War II, these states were used to cooperating 
with each other. Further, they all had similar forms of government and the 
aforementioned commitment to peaceful and democratic values. In a way, Hemmer and 
Katzenstein argue that this North Atlantic identity was imagined by the future members 
of NATO. This bears a striking resemblance to Anderson’s (2006) work Imagined 
Communities, in which he argues that nations predate nationalism, with nationalism the 
process by which nations realize what they are. 
 Collective identity, then, can be seen as a kind of “international nationalism,” 
where states form identities based on the norms they share. Taking Hemmer and 
Katzenstein’s (2002) argument slightly further, one could argue that alliances are most 
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successful when they form along collective identity lines. NATO has persisted because 
its collective identity has become so strong. 
 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that the best way to observe a norm is to 
look at justification. If a leader must justify an action, then it is outside the norm of 
behavior for his or her country. A good way to observe the effects of norms, then, is to 
see which actions must be justified and which don’t have to be justified. Norms 
legitimize and justify beyond the realm of “rationality,” appealing to the subjective 
behaviors and identities that make up “us” and “them.” 
 When US President Barack Obama gave a speech on his country’s military 
intervention in Libya, he clearly invoked NATO’s name and identity (Obama, 2011). 
Calling NATO “[the US’s] most effective alliance,” he detailed the ways that NATO 
would begin to take command in Libya. Two things really stand out in this speech. First, 
the president felt he needed to justify US military intervention in Libya, saying that it was 
both in the national interest of the US and in the best interest of the Libyan people to do 
so. Because President Obama spent the majority of his speech justifying the intervention, 
Finnemore and Sikkink would argue that those actions violated a norm. Indeed, 
considering the recent history of US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is 
unsurprising that he thought foreign intervention went against American norms. 
 However, the other standout is his lack of justification for NATO intervention. In 
fact, in this speech he only briefly mentions that NATO will take over in Libya (Obama, 
2011). The remainder of the speech emphasizes the “supporting role” that the US will 
play in the rest of the conflict, and further justifying the leading role that it took when the 
intervention began. Nowhere in the speech does the president mention why he and his 
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allies chose NATO to take over or why that was the best choice. Again remembering that 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that a leader doesn’t have to justify an action that 
lies within a norm, somewhere between 1989 and 2011 norms surrounding NATO have 
shifted. It now takes an active role in international politics, and at least President Obama 
seems to think that role requires no further explanation. In particular, he insinuates that 
NATO is a more legitimate leader in interventions than the United States. Somehow, 
NATO has become that leader in international affairs insofar as the United States is 
concerned. 
 In that speech, President Obama makes it clear that NATO doesn’t have to be 
legitimized as a military actor that can intervene without being directly acted upon. The 
US, on the other hand, had to be justified when it intervened in the same situation. This 
shows the normative power of NATO as a legitimate actor in international affairs. NATO 
is not powerful in and of itself. Because it is not a state, it doesn’t have the substantial 
standing militaries that its members possess. Instead, when its members invoke the 
NATO emblem, they provide the military, which is then coordinated under the auspices 
of the organization. Without substantial military power, then, how has NATO become a 
world leader in interventions? The answer is simple: this phenomenon is an example of 
the power of norms. In his speech on Libya, President Obama calls NATO a “broad-
based coalition” (Obama, 2011), which could signify a shift into a more liberal 
worldview. Cooperation with multiple countries, therefore, could be the reason why the 
US sees NATO as more legitimate than unilateral action. Also, one must consider when 
analyzing this speech that the recent history of unilateral US intervention has not been 
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popular, either abroad or with its citizenry. It is no surprise, therefore, that President 
Obama emphasizes the collaborative and multilateral aspects of NATO in Libya. 
 This speech, and NATO’s description of itself on its website, show that NATO’s 
identity has changed. It is now the protector of peace and defender of democracy all over 
the world. Gone is the Warsaw Pact, and with it NATO’s focus on Europe. Of course, all 
members of NATO are either European or North American (NATO, 2012b), but its 
military actions in the twenty-first century have focused on the Middle East. NATO no 
longer waits to respond, but instead takes the lead and has begun determining the course 
of international politics. Without NATO’s no-fly zone in Libya, for example, it’s hard to 
tell how much longer the civil war would have lasted, or which side would have won. 
One could argue that NATO has emerged as one of the most powerful international actors 
in the modern world, as without any real rivals it can turn the tide of a conflict without 
being challenged. 
 Realism’s take on alliances cannot explain NATO’s persistence. An alliance 
persists in realism as countries feel threatened. This threat perception is key to the 
formation of an alliance, as only when a group is threatened will they cooperate. Without 
that threat, the zero-sum game of international relations makes cooperation completely 
unrealistic. If realism is to hold up to NATO’s persistence, then, a threat should exist that 
makes NATO states feel that they must continue to cooperate to combat that threat. There 
is no threat on that scale, especially to the more major members of NATO like the US, 
UK, or France. These states’ survival is not being threatened by a major power, and 
therefore a realist would argue that NATO isn’t serving the states’ primary goal of 
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survival. Because that threat to survival isn’t present, therefore, realism has a difficult 
time explaining the persistence of NATO. 
 Liberalism cannot explain NATO’s persistence either. Like realists, liberals argue 
that states cooperate when it is in their national interest. The big departure for a liberal, 
however, is that they believe cooperation is more likely than realists do. Because states 
are not engaged in a zero-sum game, they have the ability to cooperate and achieve their 
goals together. A liberal would argue that NATO would only persist because the states 
see it in their self-interest to cooperate with each other, and that NATO provides the best 
framework against which states can cooperate. However, NATO’s main focus is military 
cooperation. Liberals would not argue that the military components of an alliance are the 
most important. NATO’s members clearly see military cooperation as the most important 
facet of their alliance, however. Liberalism cannot reconcile these differences. 
 Constructivism accounts for the shifting nature of NATO’s purpose. Europe and 
the US originally constructed NATO to balance against the Soviet Union, a motivation 
borne out of the realist orientation of the times. However, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union NATO repurposed itself to focus more on cooperation and coordination than 
balancing. Without a threat, NATO moved itself toward a more liberal worldview. 
Constructivists argue that this is due to changing norms about the world, and would say 
that NATO’s evolution is a prime example of shifting norms in response to a major 
international event.
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Chapter 3: CENTO 
 The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was a Cold War NATO affiliate that 
existed between 1955 and 1979. The US and UK originally constructed it to curb Soviet 
influence in the Middle East while simultaneously extending Western influence in the 
area. However, the volatile nature of the region ultimately meant that CENTO did not 
succeed. On paper, this alliance was very much like NATO, but CENTO failed while 
NATO has succeeded and persisted. Why the different outcome? What makes CENTO 
different from NATO? 
Background 
 NATO was the model for CENTO’s construction by the US and UK. Originally 
known as the Baghdad Pact (Khan, 1964, p. 195), its founders meant it to curb Soviet 
influence in the Middle East. It was encouraged by the Western powers of the United 
States, United Kingdom, and France, in an effort to draw the Middle East into the anti-
Soviet bloc. It began in 1955, when Iraq and Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact, giving the 
alliance its name (Hale & Bharier, 1972, p. 217). The alliance reached its final 
membership in 1955, when the United Kingdom, Iran, and Pakistan joined the Baghdad 
Pact (Ghenghea, 2010, p. 182). At this time, the alliance was also known as the Middle 
East Treaty Organization, or METO. Of note during this period is that, while the United 
States was a primary motivator to join METO, it was not a member at the time and never 
became a full member (Hale & Bharier, 1972, p. 217)
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 The US and its allies designed METO to accomplish a similar goal to NATO. 
Curbing Soviet influence in the Middle East, just like NATO in Europe, was a primary 
goal of METO. Another similarity between the two was that both considered an attack on 
one alliance member an attack on all alliance members. At inception, its members 
intended the alliance to have its own ministerial council and establish its own rules 
(Ghenghea, 2010, p. 184) like NATO has done. As Ghenghea (2010) argues, this shows 
that the US and UK designed the alliance to play an important role in the Middle East 
like NATO has in Europe. However, this was not the case. 
(D)evolution 
 Originally, the headquarters of METO were in Baghdad, Iraq. However, Iraq had 
a revolution in 1958 (Ghenghea, 2010, p. 184), and with it came a more pro-Soviet 
government. Iraq removed itself from the organization in 1959 (Hale & Bharier, 1972, p. 
218), and the organization’s headquarters shifted to Ankara, Turkey. With the shift to 
Turkey came a new name: CENTO. 
 The Middle East is an extremely volatile region, one with complex relationships 
and many conflicts. At the time, the Arab-Israeli conflict made it very difficult for Israel 
supporters to gain support from Arab states, and indeed the only Arab member of 
CENTO (Iraq) left the alliance after only four years. The remaining countries in CENTO 
at the time were Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, none of which are predominantly Arab. 
Considering that context, CENTO was unwilling to get involved in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (Ghenghea, 2010, p. 184), and therefore was quickly losing importance in the 
region. 
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 Another crack in CENTO’s effectiveness came in 1965, when Pakistan requested 
military aid from the alliance for its first war with India. The UK and the US were both 
unwilling to get involved in India, arguing that the Soviet Union was their primary 
adversary (Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 318). This again weakened CENTO’s legitimacy on the 
international stage, as its promise of military aid to its members was clearly conditional 
on the conflict being the “right one.” The Seven Days’ War between Israel and the Arab 
states followed in 1967, with US aid to Israel taking the forefront of international 
attention in the region (Ghenghea, 2010, p. 184). CENTO was quickly becoming a 
background player in international affairs. 
 Pakistan requested aid for a conflict with India again in 1971 (Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 
318), and again got denied by the other members of CENTO. This alliance was primarily 
a vehicle for the US and UK’s interests, which at the time weren’t involved in the 
subcontinent. Again, CENTO’s legitimacy was adversely affected by this denial of 
military aid. 
 Instability in the Middle East continued into the 1970s, when in 1978 a leftist 
group overthrew the president of Afghanistan (Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 328). Again, CENTO 
did not become involved in the conflict. The Islamic Revolution in Iran also happened in 
1979, overthrowing the Shah and with it the pro-Western policies that the country had 
been known for. Iran left the alliance in that year, as did Pakistan after the alliance 
repeatedly denied its requests for military aid (Ghenghea, 2010, p. 184). 
 The remaining alliance members quickly dissolved CENTO after Iran and 
Pakistan withdrew (Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 328). When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in that same year, the US intervened under the auspices of NATO. As a 
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member of that alliance, Turkey was able to receive military aid to counter Soviet 
influence in the region. So, although the US and UK designed CENTO to do for the 
Middle East what NATO did for Europe, clearly it wasn’t necessary to protect the region. 
After CENTO’s dissolution, NATO could get involved in the Middle East without a 
regional affiliate, raising the question of whether CENTO was necessary in the first 
place. 
Analysis 
 The US and its allies created CENTO to further cooperation between Middle 
Eastern and European states to counter against the Soviet Union. The US and its allies 
included states in danger of falling under Soviet influence, like Iran and Iraq, in an effort 
to incorporate them into the anti-Soviet bloc. However, CENTO failed to address 
regional concerns like the Arab-Israeli conflict. These regional concerns were more 
important to Middle Eastern countries than the structural concerns of the Cold War. 
Therefore, the alliance lost much of its legitimacy by being unable to adequately address 
concerns of member countries like Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. 
 Europe was very clearly divided between Soviet and US allies during the Cold 
War. The vast majority of European states belonged to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, 
and this clear demarcation led to conflict being diverted to outside the region. It is 
important to note that neither side during the Cold War wanted all-out conflict, as both 
sides recognized the dangers of a war between two alliances that were that powerful. 
European conflict would have made the chances of all-out war very likely, as again, the 
two sides were clearly outlined in the landscape of the region. 
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 The Middle East, however, was dominated by states that were not aligned. In 
particular, many powerful Middle Eastern states, like Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, 
among others, were part of the Non-Aligned Movement (Non-Aligned Movement, 2002). 
During the Cold War and into the present, this movement is comprised of states not 
considering themselves aligned with any major power bloc (Non-Aligned Movement, 
2002). The predominance of this view in the Middle East made conflict in the region 
impossible to classify into one of the two major blocs of the Cold War. In fact, one could 
argue that the two most major divisions of Middle Eastern conflict during the Cold War 
were “Arab” and “Israeli.” 
 Again, the most visible conflict in the Middle East during the Cold War was the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The US’s ally in this situation was Israel, which it provided with a 
massive amount of military assistance. In contrast, many of the members of CENTO 
were either not involved in this conflict or were low-profile supporters of the Arabs 
(Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 327). This added to division within the alliance, as it was involved 
on both sides of the conflict, albeit not directly. 
 Therefore, CENTO could not get involved in this conflict. The US chose to get 
involved because of its bilateral relationship with Israel, and the UK stayed out of the 
conflict. Because the alliance didn’t take the majority side (the Arab side) in the conflict, 
it was nearly impossible to get new members into the alliance. Egypt and Syria, for 
example, would not become involved in CENTO because of the US’s support for Israel, 
and instead chose to form their own alliance, the United Arab Republic (Ghenghea, 2010, 
p. 184). In fact, it actually drove many of the Middle Eastern countries to become 
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involved in the Non-Aligned Movement, as at the time the predominant viewpoint was 
that the Cold War did not concern the region. 
 Two major revolutions were also a part of delegitimizing CENTO. Iraq’s 1958 
revolution brought it to leave CENTO and join the Non-Aligned Movement (Ghenghea, 
2010, p. 184). This new regime in Iraq was much more anti-Western than the one that 
had preceded it, and therefore was much less likely to cooperate with the US and its 
allies. A similar shift occurred in 1979 with the revolution in Iran, which brought with it 
an anti-Western regime characterized by Islamic policies. Unlike before this revolution, 
Iran was now very much anti-Israel, again making cooperation with the US and its allies 
much less likely.  
 Pakistan attempted to get military aid from CENTO in its 1965 and 1971 conflicts 
with India (Dimitrakis, 2009, p. 318). When the alliance denied its requests, it took 
another hit to its legitimacy. For alliance members to see their alliance as legitimate, they 
must perceive their alliance to be accomplishing something. By the 1960s, CENTO was 
barely doing anything. Pakistan’s request was an opportunity for the alliance to get more 
involved in the region, but CENTO members like the US and UK rejected that request on 
the grounds that a conflict with India would distract from the primary goal of balancing 
against the Soviet Union. This refusal highlights one of the major flaws of CENTO. 
 The issues of the region were not addressed by CENTO. In Europe, the expansion 
of Soviet influence was a chief regional concern. NATO’s focus on that incorporated 
regional concerns, largely because European states were the primary constructers of that 
alliance. Because CENTO was constructed by the US and UK, non-Middle Eastern 
countries, it didn’t arise in this organic and regionally-focused way. Its impetus was the 
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success of NATO, with Western states arguing that the success of that alliance could be 
exported to other regions. Therefore, it seemed logical at the time that Middle Eastern 
countries would want to cooperate: they were as much neighbors of the Soviet Union as 
European countries. In fact, many were nearer to the Soviet Union. The expansion of 
communism, however, was not a chief concern regionally. Middle Eastern states were 
much more concerned with the expanse of imperialism, both Western and Soviet, and the 
existence of Israel as a new state.   
 The Middle East was barely involved in World War II. Yes, there were isolated 
campaigns and bombings. However, the large-scale destruction of the war largely took 
place elsewhere, in both Europe and East Asia. In addition, much of the Middle East was 
not independent before World War II. Therefore, one could argue that the events that 
have shaped the modern Middle East have largely occurred post-World War II, especially 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Why was this a problem for CENTO? The answer is simple: 
wars create identity and legitimacy. 
A common perspective is that war is a way to make a legitimate and powerful 
state (Herbst, 1990; Tilly, 1985). For example, Petersen (2002) argues that war can be a 
powerful motivator behind nationalism, arguing that it leads to feelings of fear that can 
band a group of people together. Collective identity is a form of nationalism to which 
states, not individuals, belong. This identity can also be forged by shared experiences 
with war. For example, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) say that NATO invoked a 
“North Atlantic identity” when writing their treaty, saying that the collective European 
and North American experience during World War II formed many of the ingredients for 
that identity. 
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Modern independent nation-states in the Middle East didn’t emerge until post-
World War II. The region lacked, therefore, the collective experience that the North 
Atlantic states drew on from that conflict to form NATO. In lieu of this collective 
experience, Western states elected to draw on the North Atlantic experience with CENTO 
as well. Like these states had done in Europe, the US and UK attempted to create an “us 
vs. them” dynamic between the members of CENTO and the Soviet Union. This tie to 
NATO’s experience tied CENTO to the Western anti-Soviet bloc at first, which was the 
original plan. However, it also led to the US and UK taking a very powerful lead in the 
alliance, leading some to observe that “CENTO policies are chained to the purposes of 
the United States” (Hale & Bharier, 1972, p. 219). Oddly, it was only until after the Cold 
War that people started observing that about NATO. During the Cold War, the interests 
of North American and European states were the same. Unlike those states, however, 
Middle Eastern states did not share the interests of the US and UK. 
The most powerful “us vs. them” dynamic in the Middle East wasn’t democracy 
vs. Communism. In the region, it was Arabs vs. Israelis. This difference in priority 
ultimately led to the downfall of CENTO. Because the Middle Eastern countries were on 
the Arab side of the conflict, and the US and UK were Israeli allies, it was impossible to 
get CENTO involved in these conflicts. This made it very difficult to attain regional 
legitimacy. The Middle East wasn’t united in the same way as Europe and North America 
was, and the alliance wasn’t dealing with concerns that affected Middle Eastern states 
and their interests. 
CENTO, therefore, was ineffectual in the region. The US and UK’s assumptions 
were not shared in the region, and many of the CENTO member states already had 
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bilateral relationships with the US. Turkey, for example, obtained aid through being 
involved in NATO, and was further tied to both European and Middle Eastern interests 
by virtue of its geographical proximity to both. Pakistan had a bilateral alliance with the 
US, and was also a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). In 
fact, Pakistan was called “America’s most allied ally in Asia” by many observers (Khan, 
1964, p. 195). The only two countries that the US was newly incorporating into its power 
bloc were Iraq and Iran, the two that eventually withdrew their membership after their 
revolutions led them to be less sympathetic towards the US than they had been 
previously. In short, CENTO failed because it couldn’t adequately address regional 
issues. The US and UK designed it to address their own international interests without 
regard for the intricacies of the region. Combined, these factors added to the air of 
illegitimacy and ineffectualness surrounding CENTO which ultimately led to its 
dissolution. 
Realists would argue that CENTO shouldn’t have failed. Because the US and UK 
were so much more powerful than the other members of CENTO, a realist would say that 
the Western states could force the Middle Eastern states to stay in. The US had bilateral 
relationships with most of the members of CENTO anyway, so those bilateral alliances 
could be used to force Middle Eastern states to cooperate. Being a member of this 
alliance, further, could be seen as balancing: with Soviet power being so close by, Middle 
Eastern states would either have to side with them or against them, according to Walt 
(2003). Realism, however, doesn’t account for the fact that Middle Eastern states didn’t 
care about the great powers. They were more concerned with the Arab/Israeli conflict in 
the region. This approach, then, doesn’t cover the reasons behind why CENTO failed. 
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Liberalism fails to account for the reasons behind forming CENTO in the first 
place. In this perspective, an alliance should be beneficial to all its members in order for 
it to be practical. However, CENTO never adequately addressed the concerns of states 
within the region. It didn’t provide benefits to both sides. The US and UK got allies in the 
region, while Middle Eastern countries didn’t get their concerns addressed. A liberal 
institutionalist, then, would argue that CENTO never should have been formed. However, 
there was clearly some reason to form it. Realism doesn’t account for its demise, and 
liberalism doesn’t account for its formation. Therefore, constructivism is again the best 
theory to explain CENTO.  
Much like in the previous case, constructivism provides the best explanation for 
CENTO. Legitimacy was the main problem facing this alliance, and constructivists 
would argue that this is because the members states did not share an identity. Without 
that shared identity, they could not associate with each other. Therefore, the alliance was 
flawed from the start from a constructivist perspective. CENTO dissolved because the 
member states didn’t want to cooperate with one another, even if there were practical 
reasons why they could have. However, the leaders who formed the alliance saw a reason 
to form it. Perhaps every leader thought it would be in the best interest of their country to 
tie themselves to this alliance, or that the alliance would evolve to tackle regional 
concerns. This leads to an important point about constructivism in general, that 
sometimes subjective reasons are more important than objective reasons. Regardless of 
whether the states had objective reasons to form or join CENTO or to eventually leave or 
dissolve it, it was subjective reasons that guided those decisions
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Chapter 4: US-South Korea 
 The US’s alliance with South Korea started with the Korean War in 1950. Since 
then, South Korea has rapidly developed with the aid of the United States, becoming one 
of the most powerful countries and economies internationally. This rapid transformation 
has meant change for the alliance as well, and some friction has developed between the 
two countries as a result. How has the alliance developed, and why has it evolved before 
accomplishing its purpose? 
Background 
 Imperial Japan ruled the Korean Peninsula from 1910 until the end of World War 
II (Stueck & Yi, 2010, p. 178). At the end of World War II, the victorious Allies 
partitioned the peninsula into two zones, the US-occupied Republic of Korea in the south 
and the Soviet-occupied Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north (Stueck & 
Yi, 2010, p. 178). Both sets of forces departed in 1948 (Stueck & Yi, 2010, p. 203), 
leaving South and North Korea without extensive foreign presence in their territory. 
However, almost immediately after gaining independence, North Korea attacked South 
Korea. 
 North and South Korea fought the Korean War between the years 1950 and 1953. 
China and the Soviet Union were the primary supporters of North Korea, with the US and 
the UN supporting South Korea (Kleiner, 2006, p. 215). This serves as an example of a 
Cold War proxy war, with no superpower being invaded or invading the other, but 
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choosing allies in a smaller-level conflict. As the US’s ally in the conflict, it became clear 
that South Korea would be an important ally to retain after the war. 
After a truce was established, in 1953, South Korea and the United States signed 
the Mutual Defense Treaty(Bandow, 2010, p. 3). This established the military alliance 
between the two states that has endured ever since. In the years immediately succeeding 
the war, South Korea was completely reliant on military aid from the United States to 
deter another North Korean attack like the one in 1950 (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1075). This 
extensive military aid gradually led to more US assistance in other areas in South Korea, 
including economic development (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1076). 
Purpose 
 What was the original purpose of the bilateral alliance between the US and South 
Korea? At its onset, the US intended the alliance to deter another North Korean attack 
(Lee, 2007, p. 469). To do so, the United States poured aid into South Korea, developing 
both its economy and defense infrastructures (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1075). By 1973, the US 
had given more aid to South Korea ($11 billion) than any other country, excepting South 
Vietnam, which no longer exists (Sungjoo, 1980, pp. 1075-1076). 
 The two countries had different reasons for entering into the alliance in the first 
place. Much like with NATO and CENTO, along with many other alliances during the 
Cold War, the US’s primary goal in entering this alliance was to counter Communist 
expansion in the region, as well as to protect Japan and US bases in Okinawa (Sungjoo, 
1980, p. 1076). Considering South Korea’s proximity to a Soviet ally, North Korea, this 
choice wasn’t difficult to make. Factor in a war between the two, and the US’s choice 
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becomes even easier. It was a chance to balance against the Soviet Union and shore up a 
new ally. 
 South Korea’s concern was much more simple. Rather than being concerned 
about the entire Cold War or the Soviet Union, this country wanted to deter another 
invasion from North Korea (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1076). It needed the aid from the United 
States, especially to counter the aid that China and the Soviet Union were giving to North 
Korea at the time By situating itself as one of the US’s major allies in the region, further, 
it secured a bigger portion of that aid. At its onset, then, the US-South Korea alliance 
made sense for both parties involved. The alliance was achieving the purpose of deterring 
Soviet expansion into the area by containing North Korea on the peninsula. 
Evolution 
 When it began, this alliance was inherently asymmetrical. South Korea had only 
been independent since 1948, and the US was one of the two major international powers 
at the time. However, as South Korea began to democratize and modernize in the late 
1980s (Lee, 2007, p. 469), relations between the two countries have changed. Dong Sun 
Lee (2007) argues that the rise of Korean nationalism during the democratization process 
weakened South Korea’s alliance with the US (p. 474). He goes on to argue, however, 
that this process has been more gradual in South Korea than it was in other similar cases, 
like the Philippines. Instead of attempting to become more autonomous immediately after 
democratizing, South Korea’s relationship with the US has gone through a more gradual 
transition. 
 As Kleiner (2006) argues, as conditions change within countries the relations 
between them cannot be expected to hold constant. South Korea has rapidly developed 
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and changed, and therefore its relationship with the US has changed as well. The alliance 
was extremely one-sided at first, with the US taking the lead and often making major 
policy decisions on both countries’ behalf, like keeping operational control of South 
Korea’s military (Sungjoo, 1980, p. 1077). With Park Chung-Hee’s successful coup in 
1961, more nationalist and sovereignty-oriented policies began to rise in South Korea. 
These policies challenged the asymmetrical nature of the alliance. 
Present 
 The character and degree of the alliance between the US and South Korea has 
been in question for a while; in particular, South Korea’s rise to economic independence 
and political development have contributed to this challenge. Contemporary debate 
(Bandow, 2010; Stueck & Yi, 2010; Suh, 2007) surrounding the issue is heated, and 
regional experts disagree on which outcome will be better for both sides of the alliance. 
This study will not attempt to answer this question, only present the alliance’s 
development in an effort to show the strength of its argument. 
 There has been a big shift in the balance between South Korea and the US. South 
Korea is no longer a new state troubled by a recent war with its neighbor. Now, it is an 
economic force to be reckoned with, and has risen meteorically on the world stage since 
1961. South Korea currently has a GDP of $1.549 trillion, the 13th-highest GDP in the 
world (CIA, 2012a). In contrast, North Korea’s GDP is estimated to be about $40 billion, 
the 99th-highest in the world (CIA, 2012b).The alliance between the US and South Korea, 
then, is unique in that the weaker partner (South Korea) has risen to become substantially 
stronger, especially relative to North Korea. The contemporary debate on this alliance 
centers around this issue, that South Korea no longer needs the amount of aid that it 
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needed at the alliance’s onset. While North Korea clearly still exists, it is substantially 
weaker than it used to be, and therefore South Korea’s relative power has increased 
substantially since it entered into the alliance with the US. 
Analysis 
 Bandow (2010) argues that the US-South Korean alliance no longer serves any 
purpose. Coming from a realist perspective, he says that neither side needs the other for 
its defense (Bandow, 2010, p. 7), and therefore is not necessary. He argues that South 
Korea has become more independent, and that its military has already far outstripped the 
capabilities of its northern neighbor. By modernizing, he says, South Korea has grown 
into a state that can easily counter any North Korean aggression in the region. It is 
capable of defending itself, he says, and therefore should do so (Bandow, 2010, p. 6). 
 However, many scholars (Lee, 2007; Stueck & Yi, 2010; Suh, 2007) disagree 
with Bandow. Instead, they argue that the historically strong US-South Korean 
relationship has developed into a shared identity that can allow the alliance to persist over 
time. Stueck and Yi (2010) argue, for example, that the South Korean identity has 
absorbed American ways of life, saying that modes of transportation, education levels, 
and many other things have become more similar between the two countries as the 
alliance has progressed (p. 207). Suh (2007) agrees, saying that although the capabilities 
of the members of the alliance have changed, shared identity between them has grown 
stronger over time. 
 Realists would come at this problem in one of two ways. This approach, 
exemplified by Bandow (2010), would argue that the military alliance doesn’t have to 
exist anymore. South Korea doesn’t need US military aid anymore, and the US doesn’t 
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face an existential threat from the existence of Communism on the peninsula. However, 
there is a prevailing impression in foreign policy circles in both countries that North 
Korea is a “rogue state,” leading to concerns that North Korea won’t behave rationally. 
Further, North Korea is in possession of nuclear weapons, something that realists like 
Schelling (2003) see as a game-changing facet of a country’s threat level. Realists, then, 
could also argue that dissolving the military alliance between South Korea and the US 
doesn’t make any sense. If both countries have a stake in the persistence of the North 
Korean threat, then pooling resources to balance against it is practical. Further, the realist 
argument deemphasizes nonmilitary components of the alliance, like the Free Trade 
Agreement between the two countries that entered into force on March 15, 2012 (United 
States Trade Representative, 2012). The realist approach, therefore, misses central 
components of the debate surrounding the issue. First, realists argue that only military 
components of the alliance are important, and the US-South Korean alliance contains 
much more than exclusively military cooperation. Second, the debate surrounding the 
alliance isn’t only looking at military cooperation, instead focusing on other 
repercussions of the alliance to determine its usefulness. 
 An alliance should be mutually beneficial, liberals argue. When the two countries 
entered into their agreement, the alliance was beneficial. The US got an ally in East Asia, 
and was better able to counteract Communist influence on the Korean Peninsula. South 
Korea got aid from the US, enabling it to develop. Since South Korea is now developed, 
however, the benefits are in question. Because the alliance is so total in scope, the now-
developed South Korea is beginning to question whether it needs that level of US 
involvement in its affairs. A liberal would argue, then, that the alliance will develop its 
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role based on what the countries see as beneficial. This approach, however, misses some 
important parts of the decisionmaking process. For example, it doesn’t account for the 
perception of North Korea as a threat or the US’s military presence, both historical and 
present-day, in South Korea. Nuclear weapons in North Korea are also unaccounted for 
by this approach. Both realism and liberalism, then, miss aspects of the process that 
South Korean decisionmakers are going through. 
In order to capture all sides of the argument, a constructivist approach must be 
used. Constructivists would argue that, in this situation, it is the evolving norms that are 
important. First, the Korean War sparked a change in US norms, that South Korea was a 
country to be protected from their aggressive, even evil, Communist neighbor. After that 
norm was well-ingrained into the culture of the US, South Korea rapidly developed and 
began to explore a new norm, equal partnership with the US. The issue with the alliance 
is not something practical or beneficial, it’s about what it means to the states to be equal. 
What does an equal South Korea act like? How does the US respond to actions that South 
Korea takes, now that the US is no longer dictating those decisions? Is North Korea a 
“rogue state?” If so, what does that mean for North Korean actions and for the alliance? 
The growing pains of this alliance can be attributed to the shifting norms surrounding it, 
and as the situation is resolved it will become apparent which norms ended up 
succeeding.
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Chapter 5: Large-N Analysis 
 This chapter employs large-N quantitative analysis to test the study’s claims about 
alliance persistence and shared norms. Coupling the case studies that precede this chapter 
with large-N quantitative analysis allows this study to lessen concerns about case 
selection bias. The hypothesis of this chapter is that there is a positive correlation 
between alliance persistence and shared norms between their members. Norms, however, 
cannot be measured directly. The next section outlines how these norms are 
operationalized in a way that can be measured. 
Definitions, Data, and Methods 
 For the purposes of this chapter, an alliance is defined as an agreement between 
states for military purposes The full list of alliances fitting that definition and their 
members can be found in Appendix A. Considering the dominance of realist norms in 
contemporary international politics, cooperating for military purposes is one of the most 
significant forms of trust that states can give one another. Therefore, a selective definition 
that only includes military agreements focuses on the most prominent alliances in the 
contemporary political landscape. This definition could also be argued to be the most 
utilitarian. In this way, this study is able to challenge realism on its own terms: utilitarian 
alliances for exclusively military purposes. 
 Examining the effects of shared norms on alliance persistence is the goal of this 
chapter. To look at those effects, a dataset had to be found that could accurately measure 
norms within a variety of countries, in a way that was consistent between the countries. 
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The World Values Survey Association (2009) provides that dataset. The particular dataset 
in this chapter is the 1981-2008 aggregate dataset, which stores responses at the 
individual level and has information from all of the waves that the World Values Survey 
(WVS) Association has done. In order to use this dataset, a key addition had to be made. I 
added a dummy variable (coded 1 if a member and 0 otherwise) for each alliance listed in 
Appendix A. This made it possible to make comparisons across alliances, which is the 
primary focus of this study. 
 The WVS interviews respondents on a wide variety of subjects, and four of those 
subjects, coded as scales, are the best choices for this study. The scales, measuring 
postmaterialist values, autonomous orientation, traditional vs. secular values, and the 
utility of survival vs. self-expression, are the best choices for a few key reasons. This is 
not a study on the effects of regime type on alliance formation. Therefore, the 
measurements contained in this chapter had to be isolated from the effects of regime type 
in the best way possible.  Unlike questions that might be directly correlated to regime 
type, like the value of democracy, the four values contained in this chapter are general 
enough to mitigate and minimize the effects of regime type. However, they are not so 
general that they avoid the central argument of this thesis, that alliances create shared 
norms between their members and are more likely to persist the more successful they are 
in that endeavor. These orientations, therefore, are the best way to isolate the effects of 
regime type without eliminating the possibility for international norms  to trickle down 
into domestic politics. 
 In order to look at the correlation of norms and alliance persistence, this study 
uses variance ratio tests. These tests show the difference in variance between 
 
46 
observations of one group versus another. In interpretation, this can show how “clumped 
together” the members of one group are versus another. Therefore, the test is used in this 
study to show whether the members of an alliance are closer together or further apart than 
non-members on all four observations. 
Results 
 Findings from each variance ratio test are summarized in Tables A, B, C, and D, 
organized by dependent variables. Standard deviation of the alliance in question is 
reported, as well as whether it is more or less variant than the population. The 
significance of the difference is also reported. 
Table A. Postmaterialism 
Alliance Name Standard Deviation Relation to Population 
NATO 1.238 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
EU 1.23 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
CSTO 1.095 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SCO 1.067 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Rio Pact 1.188 Less Variant 
(0.156) 
ANZUS 1.237 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
Five Power Defense 
Agreement 
1.212 More Variant^ 
(0.09) 
US-South Korea 1.18 Less Variant* 
(0.02) 
US-Philippines 1.193 Less Variant 
(0.518) 
Warsaw Pact 1.224 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
SEATO 1.228 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
CENTO 1.236 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
Notes: ^ p < .10  * p <.05  **p<.01 
 Table A summarizes the findings from the test comparing the variances of 
different alliances and the population on the measure of postmaterialism. As the reader 
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can no doubt see from the table, the CSTO, the SCO, and the US-South Korean alliance 
have significantly (0.05) less variance than the population. This means that members of 
this alliance are more grouped together on this issue than the population at large. NATO, 
the EU, ANZUS, the Warsaw Pact, SEATO, and CENTO, on the other hand, have 
significantly more variance than the population. These alliances, therefore, have more 
variance within their members on postmaterialism than the population at large. 
Table B. Autonomy 
Alliance Name Standard Deviation Relation to Population 
NATO 1.14 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
EU 1.096 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
CSTO 1.037 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SCO 0.997 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Rio Pact 1.137 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
ANZUS 1.128 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Five Power Defense 
Agreement 
1.092 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
US-South Korea 1.106 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
US-Philippines 1.137 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Warsaw Pact 1.123 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SEATO 1.164 Less Variant** 
(0.004) 
CENTO 1.127 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Notes: ^ p < .10  * p <.05  **p<.01 
 The findings from comparing variance on autonomy are summarized in Table B. 
No matter what alliance was being considered in this test, there was statistically less 
variance among its members. This shows that the alliances contained in this study are all 
significantly more likely to share values on autonomy than states not in their alliance. 
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Table C. Traditional vs. Secular 
Alliance Name Standard Deviation Relation to Population 
NATO 1 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
EU 1.047 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
CSTO 0.597 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SCO 0.592 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Rio Pact 0.753 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
ANZUS 0.893 More Variant** 
(0.003) 
Five Power Defense 
Agreement 
0.981 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
US-South Korea 0.9 More Variant* 
(0.048) 
US-Philippines 0.93 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
Warsaw Pact 0.835 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SEATO 0.954 More Variant** 
(0.004) 
CENTO 0.849 Less Variant* 
(0.011) 
Notes: ^ p < .10  * p <.05  **p<.01 
 Table C summarizes this study’s findings on the variance between alliance 
members on traditional vs. secular values. The CSTO, SCO, Rio Pact, Warsaw Pact, and 
CENTO were all significantly (0.05) less variant than the population. In those alliances, 
then, values are closer together than the general population. Other alliances, including 
NATO, the EU, ANZUS, the Five Power Defense Agreement, US-South Korea, US-
Philippines, and SEATO, were significantly more variant than the population. Values in 
these alliances, then, are more spread out than the general populace. 
 In this test, summarized in Table D, the variance on survival vs. self-expression 
was tested. The EU, CSTO, SCO, Rio Pact, US-Philippines, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, and 
CENTO all had significantly less variation than the population. The only alliance with 
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significantly more variance than the population was the one between the US and South 
Korea. 
Table D. Survival vs. Self-Expression 
Alliance Name Standard Deviation Relation to Population 
NATO 0.68 Less Variant 
(0.643) 
EU 0.622 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
CSTO 0.577 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SCO 0.573 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Rio Pact 0.647 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
ANZUS 0.687 More Variant 
(0.857) 
Five Power Defense 
Agreement 
0.682 Less Variant 
(0.626) 
US-South Korea 0.721 More Variant** 
(0.000) 
US-Philippines 0.632 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Warsaw Pact 0.588 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
SEATO 0.654 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
CENTO 0.641 Less Variant** 
(0.000) 
Notes: ^ p < .10  * p <.05  **p<.01 
Analysis 
 Entering into this chapter, the hypothesis was that there was a significant 
relationship between the amount of variance on values between members of an alliance 
and their persistence. This was supported by the case studies contained in the previous 
chapters, where I argued that a common identity means the difference between success 
and failure. For this chapter to support those claims and reject the null hypothesis, the 
four value orientations from the WVS (postmaterialism, autonomy, traditional vs. secular, 
and survival vs. self-expression) should have had different variances based on whether 
the alliance persisted. 
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 However, the study did not have those findings. Every alliance, for example, had 
less variance on autonomy than the general population. In the other value orientations, 
findings did not depend on whether an alliance persisted. For example, while 
postmaterialist values had more variation with the Warsaw Pact, SEATO, and CENTO, it 
also had more variance with NATO, the EU, the Five Power Defense Agreement, and 
other alliances that have successfully persisted. This study fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, therefore, and can only conclude that there is insufficient evidence to argue 
that there is a significant relationship between shared norms and alliance persistence. 
Conclusion 
 There are a few reasons for why there is a disconnect between the qualitative case 
studies in previous chapters and the insignificant findings in this chapter. Perhaps most 
compelling is the argument that the variables used in this chapter are necessary but not 
sufficient for alliance formation and persistence. Considering the strong correlation 
between autonomy orientation and alliances in general, for example, a future study could 
look at whether autonomy values are an indicator of alliances being formed rather than 
persisting. Maybe states only form alliances with other like-minded states, and certain 
issues (like autonomy) could be more important than others to that formation. 
Another reason for why this chapter didn’t find significant results could be the 
values chosen. The WVS surveys respondents on a wide variety of issues, and this 
chapter only includes four. Perhaps other orientations, like attitudes towards democracy 
or the separation of religion and state, are more relevant for the persistence of alliances. 
Future researchers, therefore, could analyze these other orientations in the same way that 
I did. 
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Finally, the method of analysis chosen could be the wrong choice for what this 
study is trying to measure. I chose to use variance ratio tests, and I could have chosen any 
number of other options. Truth tables could serve as an interesting way to test this, for 
example. Future researchers should consider other ways to measure “shared norms” if 
they wish to follow in this study’s path. Other methods will have different results. 
Measuring shared norms is difficult, and this chapter shows that methods should 
be carefully considered before being chosen. This chapter did not find significant results, 
which could be due to any number of factors. Maybe the values incorporated were 
necessary but not sufficient for alliance persistence, in which case researchers can look at 
other factors for why alliances persist, like shared regime or other value orientations. 
Another option for future research is to choose another type of methodology, like truth 
tables or logistic regression. Even though it didn’t find significant results, therefore, this 
chapter still has implications for further research in the subject area.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 This study attempts to look at why some alliances persist over time, while others 
fail before their goals are accomplished. The case studies in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
presented an effective argument for the power of norms to make persistence more likely. 
They argued that NATO’s success has been due in part to the collective identity it has 
created among its members. Although “NATO member state” has meant different things 
at different times, it has always existed as an identity. In the contemporary world, many 
states appeal to their status as NATO members to justify their actions, pointing to the 
possibility that NATO is more legitimate than its member states. CENTO, on the other 
hand, failed in part because it didn’t create a collective identity. It ignored most of the 
important issues in the region, and failed to legitimize itself by taking a larger role in its 
region. By doing that, then, it created a reputation of being ineffectual and useless, 
something that NATO certainly did not do. Further, the final case of the US-South Korea 
alliance showed the identity evolution process as it is happening. This alliance is 
examining a new purpose in the international world, and is experiencing the growing 
pains that go along with any significant change. 
In those case studies, identity was argued to have an extremely important role in 
determining the ability of an alliance to persist. To make that argument, constructivism as 
an approach to IR had to be argued to be the most accurate. All three chapters discussed 
the merits of constructivism relative to realism and liberalism. Realism’s focus on 
military and utilitarian factors of alliances misses the possibility for further cooperation 
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between allies. None of the three cases contained in this study supported realism’s 
claims, as the existence of an external threat doesn’t seem to indicate an alliance’s 
chances of success or failure. Liberalism’s look at the practicality of cooperation doesn’t 
adequately explain alliances either, as many states formed alliances to combat a threat. 
Without that threat, the alliances would never have existed. Constructivism combines a 
realist beginning with a liberal resolution, showing that as norms evolve in response to 
international events, the identities of alliances can as well. 
The quantitative chapter did not find a significant relationship between shared 
values and alliance persistence. However, it exposed possible flaws in the methodology 
used. It has implications for future research, therefore, as it provides a roadmap for which 
methodological choices to make. 
In conclusion, the alliance literature has ignored collective identity until recently. 
Therefore, this study attempts to add to that sparse body of literature. Shared identities 
have had an effect on some alliances, like NATO and CENTO, and may serve to have an 
effect in evolving cases like the US-South Korean alliance. The power of a norm is not to 
be overlooked, and must be analyzed when making claims about international security. 
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Appendix A. List of alliances surveyed in Chapter 5. 
Alliance Name (Citation) Alliance Members Date Begun-Date Ended 
NATO (NATO, 2012b) Belgium; Canada; Denmark; 
France; Iceland; Italy; 
Luxembourg; Netherlands; 
Norway; Portugal; UK; US; 
Greece; Turkey; Germany 
(West Germany before 
reunification); Spain; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Poland; 
Bulgaria; Estonia; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Romania; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Albania; Croatia 
1949-present 
EU (European Union, 2012) Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Estonia; Finland; 
France; Germany; Greece; 
Hungary; Ireland; Italy; 
Latvia; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Malta; 
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; 
Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Spain; Sweden; UK 
1992-present 
CSTO (Bordyuzha, 2011) Armenia*; Belarus*; 
Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; 
Russia; Tajikistan; Uzbekistan 
1992-present 
SCO (Aris, 2009) China; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Russia; 
Tajikistan; Uzbekistan 
2001-present 
US-South Korea (Suh, 2007) South Korea; US 1953-present 
Mutual Defense Treaty (de 
Castro, 2009) 
Philippines; US 1951-present 
SADC, affiliated with 
UNASUR (UNASUR, 2012) 
Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; 
Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; 
Guyana; Paraguay; Peru; 
Suriname; Uruguay;  
2008-present 
ANZUS (Tow & Albinski, 
2002) 
Australia; New Zealand; US 1951-present 
Five Power Defense 
Agreement (Bristow, 2005) 
Australia; Malaysia; New 
Zealand; Singapore; UK 
1971-present 
SEATO (Ruane, 2005) Australia; New Zealand; 
Pakistan; Philippines; 
Thailand; UK; US 
1954-1977 
CENTO (Ghenghea, The 
Central Treaty Organization: 
Element of the Western Anti-
Iran; Iraq; Pakistan; Turkey; 
UK 
1955-1979 
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Soviet System, 2010) 
Warsaw Pact (Cavendish, 2005) Albania; Bulgaria; 
Czechoslovak Republic*; East 
Germany; Hungary; Poland; 
Romania; Soviet Union* 
1955-1991 
Rio Pact (Organization of 
American States, 2012) 
Argentina; Bahamas; Bolivia; 
Brazil; Chile; Colombia; 
Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominican 
Republic; Ecuador; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti; 
Honduras; Nicaragua; 
Panama; Paraguay; Peru; 
Trinidad and Tobago; US; 
Uruguay; Venezuela 
1947-present 
*Signifies a state for which there was no World Values Survey data available during the 
duration of the alliance listed. 
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